Abstract. This paper considers a re®nement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an example shows that there is no exact correspondence between perfect equilibrium points and the perfect Nash equilibria of the related trade-o¨games.
Introduction
Interactive decision situations with more than one decision maker and in which multiple objectives play a role, can be modelled by means of multicriteria games, an alternative name for games with vector payo¨s.
A pioneering paper which deals with multicriteria games is Blackwell (1956) . Here an analog of the minimax theorem is provided for repeated zerosum games with vector payo¨s based on the concepts of approachability/ excludability of subsets of payo¨vectors. Shapley (1959) de®ned the notion of equilibrium points for (one-shot) two-person games with vector payo¨s and showed the correspondence between equilibria and Nash equilibria of socalled trade-o¨games.
For zero sum games this approach is elaborated in Zeleny (1976), Nieuwenhuis (1983) and Corley (1985) , for non-zero sum games in Borm, van den Aarssen and Tijs (1988) and Ghose and Prasad (1989) . Applications of zerosum bicriterion games to combat games can be found in Prasad and Ghose (1988) . Manuscript received: March 1997 Existence theorems for equilibria in games with vector payo¨s are provided in Wang (1991) . Zhao (1991) describes Multiple Objective Mathematical Programming problems and de®nes equilibria for multiple objective games in strategic form by means of vector-maximization problems. He introduces properly e½cient solutions for such games.
Up to now multicriteria analysis has attracted relatively little attention in the literature on games although the decision theoretic counterpart w.r.t. multiobjective programming is rather well-developed. We refer to Cochrane and Zeleny (1973) , Cohon (1978) and more recently French et al. (1983) , Chankong and Haimes (1983) , Steuer (1986) and Vincke (1992) . In our opinion multicriteria games can be of use in modelling various real-life situations where several objectives have to be taken into account such as in politics and management decisions, especially in situations in which the agents do not have an a priori opinion on the relative importance of the components of their payo¨vectors.
This paper aims for a re®nement theory for (weak) equilibria for non zerosum multi-criteria games based on ideas and insights of the extensive literature on re®nements for Nash equilibria in unicriterium games (cf. van Damme (1991) ). In particular we introduce perfect equilibrium points in the sense of Selten (1975) . Throughout the paper an example of a multicriteria productioninspection game illustrates the notions of equilibrium points, perfect equilibrium points and related trade-o¨games.
Section 2 contains the necessary de®nitions on multicriteria games and equilibrium points and recalls the correspondence between equilibria and Nash equilibria of related trade-o¨games.
Section 3 extends the characterization of a Nash equilibrium, the carriers being subsets of the best reply sets, to equilibrium points for multicriteria games in the sense that the carriers have to be subsets of a so-called e½cient pure best reply sets. This characterization also reveals the possibility to order the strategies by means of levels of best reply sets, thus providing a ®rst indication towards a properness concept a Á la Myerson (1978) . The de®nition of perfect equilibria by means of perturbed games is generalized towards multicriteria games in section 4. Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown using the characterization of equilibrium points given in section 3.
Section 5 describes two alternative characterizations of perfect equilibria a Â la van Damme (1991), one of them using the concept of e-perfectness. Here it is also seen that contrary to the result for equilibrium points, there is no exact correspondence between perfect equilibria and perfect Nash equilibria of the corresponding trade-o¨games.
Section 6 concludes with some remarks on the case when one would apply a weaker concept of domination, providing stronger equilibria.
Equilibrium points for multicriteria games
We consider mixed extensions of n-person ®nite strategic multicriteria games. These are games with a player set N f1Y F F F Y ng in which each player i has a ®nite set of pure strategies S i fs i1 Y s i2 Y F F F Y s imi g. Pure strategy combinations s e n j1 S j provide to each player i``payo¨s'' given by an ri-vector valued function K i X n j1 S j 3 R ri , i.e. player i takes ri criteria into account. Considering mixed strategies we let hS i represent
